T he history of southern Africa changed at 12:20 AM on April25, 1974 . If at that moment you had been listening to Lisbon's Radio Renascen<;a, you'd have heard an eerie rendition of the song "Grandola, Vila Morena." Composed by musician Zeca Afonso two years earlier, the quiet ballad eulogized fraternity, democracy, and fairnessvalues that had eroded under a forty-year dictatorship in
Portugal. "It is the people who lead I Inside of you, oh city," Afonso sang. "It is the people who lead I In the shadow of a holm oak I Which no longer knew its age." His words announced the beginning of a carefully orchestrated military coup-months in the planning-against Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano, who had ruled the country since its previous dictator, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, suffered a stroke in 1968. Later named the Carnation Revolution, the affair was over within hours. Caetano accerted exile in Brazil; and a military junta, led first by Genera Antonio de Spinola and then Francisco da Costa Gomes, took the reins of government to establish a framework to end Portuguese colonialism in Africa and create a genuine democracy at home. When the junta disbanded two years later, Portugal was a fundamentally different country, and southern Africa-the region where so many anti-Caetano soldiers had fought and died in the name of empire-was being transformed by the dual imperatives of decolonization and superpower geopolitics.
The 1 His diagnosis hinted at the quiet before a storm. As Burton demonstrates, events in southern Africa consumed Washington during the next two years. Although Kissinger had derisively suggested in 1969 that "history [had] never been produced in the South," the region moved inexorably from the periphery to the center of U.S foreign relations after 1974. 2 Whether in Angola, where Portuguese decolonization prompted an ill-fated U.S. covert operation that led to an acrimonious congressional investigation, or in Zimbabwe, where Kissinger became deeply involved in peace negotiations, top U.S. officials found it impossible to ignore the historical transformations that unfolded in tne wake of the Carnation Revolution. The region was the first great battleground of the post-Vietnam Cold War, and events there were the harbinger of changes that
would remake U.S. global power in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Burton's document collection is one of the better FRUS volumes I have read. By selectively blending policy statements and memoranda with meeting minutes and phone records, she rrovides the reader with a useful summary of official thinking and quotable anecdotes to illuminate the frustrations, eccentricities, and hubris of U.S. leaders. The collection is organized in four chapters that proceed chronologically and thematically. The first section, entitled "Regional Issues," covers the Nixon administration's early dealings with southern Africa, lingering on the formation of National Security Study Memorandum 39, which announced that regional change would only come through collaboration witn white rulers, and the passage of the so-called Byrd Amendment, which rolled back U.S. sanctions against Ian Smith's controversial government in Salisbury. The second and third sections flow together, covering Portuguese decolonization and the Angolan civil war between 1974 and 1976. Here, Burton expertly highlights the role of Zambia and Zaire in prodding the United States into action and illustrates how the Cold War helped distil a complex reality into easy bullet points in Washington. The volume ends with a section called "Independence Negotiations," which explores Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the region at the end of 1976. Eager perhaps to rehabilitate his reputation after the Angolan debacle, the secretary of state essentially renounced National Security Study Memorandum 39 and nudged Smith into indirect dialogue with Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, and several of the liberation organizations, setting the stage for initiatives that carried into the Jimmy Carter administration.
This period and region have already been examined in two of our field's more prominent international histories, Piero Gleijeses's Conflicting Missions (Chapel Hill, 2002) and Odd Arne Westad's The Global Cold War (Cambridge, 2005). Burton's collection, in part, confirms the conclusions of these books. For instance, Gleijeses's once-controversial claim that Angola's MPLA had more support than UNITA or FNLA and therefore possessed more 1egitimacy than its rivals is tacitly confirmed by U.S. consular cables, meetings minutes, and policy documents. Kissinger was at his most cynical in 1975. Although he made no secret of his belief that the "history of Africa [had] shown that a nation's only focal point [was] the capital" (113) and admitted that the MPLA controlled Luanda and most of Angola's populated areas (135), the secretary nonetheless moved against conventional wisdom in Washington and put America's weight behind an illogical covert operation that ended in disaster. "What real choice do we have?" he queried blandly as CIA funds flowed into the region that summer. "I know the AF bureau says that [Africans] care about economic aid, but there's no empirical evidence for that" (111). The subsequent civil war lasted twenty-five years, left 500,000 Angolans dead, and put the MPLA (eventually) at the helm of a country engulfed by AIDS and ethnic strife. 
